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PUBLIC POLICY ON PARALLEL IMPORTS IN KOREA: THE WELFARE 
EFFECT FOR CONSUMERS IN THE KOREAN GOLF MARKET, AND POLICY 
SUGGESTIONS 
An Abstract 
Policy on the parallel imports of medicines is being debated currently in Korea. 
This paper looks at several countries' trends, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement, and the Korean golf market to search for policy ideas. A 
simple consumer welfare benefit-cost and sensitivity analysis shows that parallel 
imports give not only consumers' surplus on parallel imported golf clubs, but also a 
much larger consumers' surplus on authorized brand versions. 
This paper makes the following recommendations: First, parallel imports should be 
permitted according to the principle of free trade, if the cost of parallel imports to the 
country is not much larger than the benefit. Second, even if parallel impmts are 
pem1itted, some exceptional cases should be allowed where international exhaustion is 
problematic. Third, governmental intervention, a clear labeling system, for example, is 




Parallel imports are genuine products imported without the intellectual property rights 
- copyright, patent or trademark - of the owner's authorization. When the owner of 
intellectual property causes the same product to be sold in different countries for different 
prices, and if someone else imports the low-price good into the high-price country, it is a 
parallel import. Parallel imports occur when goods produced or sold abroad with the 
consent of the intellectual property rights holders are subsequently imported into the 
domestic market ( or the third country) without the consent of the right owner. Parallel 
imports have been the subject of considerable debate and controversy in the international 
trade-policy arena. There is a variety of issues at stake, including economic, legal, 
marketing, international and commercial matters. On the one hand, it is desirable to 
protect the public from confusion or deception regarding the origin of branded products. 
On the other hand, there are apparent good reasons for preventing copyright and 
trademarks from being used to divide markets and to create artificial barriers to free trade 
(Skoko, 1998). 
In spite of a lot of debate, parallel trade in the world is increasing. According to 
NERA (National Economic Research Associates, 1999) reports, the parallel import 
market share in music compact discs is 10-20%, in consumer electronics is 5%, and in 
cosmetics and perfumes is up to 13% within the EU. In the U.S., a 1988 estimate of the 
size of the parallel import market was $7-10 billion per year, and some 60,000 parallel 
imported cars were impmied from Europe in 1985 (Gallini and Hollis, 1999). The 
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Canadian Health Ministry estimates that parallel trade represents 1-2% of all U.S. drug 
sales (www.ey.com/industry/health, August 2003) and there is pending legislation to 
allow for the re-importation of prescription drugs into the U.S. 
Korea, basically, has not allowed parallel imports, but there have been some 
exceptions since November 1995. Parallel imports were only allowed for trademarked 
goods, partly to combat high prices of brand products and eliminate inefficiencies in their 
distribution systems. In 1995, the Korea Consumer Protection Board researched the price 
of the 20 main imported consumer goods. They are primarily imported through 
monopolistic distribution channels and their price level is about 2. 7 times higher than the 
average imported cost price. Their margin of profit is 3 .6 times higher than the same kind 
of Korean domestic consumer good (Mygung and Sungmi 2001). The Ministry of 
Finance and Economy decided to allow parallel imports to lower their margin of profit 
and reduce rising price. In 1998, the parallel imports of cosmetics were also allowed. The 
main items of parallel imports were golf clubs, clothing, handbags, ski supplies, bags and 
cosmetics. 
The issue of permitting parallel imports of patented and trademarked medicines is 
being debated cun-ently in Korea. There are big concerns and controversies about the 
possibility of parallel impmied medicine, protecting intellectual property rights, and the 
economic, social, and health effects of parallel imports. The supporters of parallel 
imports emphasize that parallel imports decreases prices, increase consumer surplus and 
contribute to the liberalization of trade. The opponents, on the other hand, insist that 
parallel imports don't ensure the safety of medicine and destroy the domestic industry. 
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They also insist that the effect of lowering the price of parallel imports will be small and 
will only cause misunderstanding and confusion amongst consumers. 
Therefore, in order to know the real effects of parallel imports, we need to analyze the 
representative parallel import market on many levels. However, there are no empirical 
studies in this field in Korea. This paper is going to study the International Agreement on 
parallel imports and simply analyze the consumer benefits and costs of parallel imported 
golf clubs, one of the main parallel imported items. This study will try to derive public 
policy ideas that can be applied to parallel imports in Korea. 
II. The Understanding of the Parallel Imports 
1. The Concept of Parallel Imports 
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Parallel imports, also known as the gray market (normal products or the imported 
products from authorized channels are called white goods, and black market goods are 
called black goods), are genuine products which are protected by intellectual property 
rights but are imported without authorization from the holders of the intellectual property 
rights. These goods, however, are not counterfeited or pirated merchandise. For example : 
At the University of Oregon, a student imported 20 public policy books published by an 
American author from Canada this spring and sold them outside his classroom for less 
than the University of Oregon bookstore price, netting a $500 profit. The public policy 
books are not copybooks but the same books that are sold in the US. Next term, if all 
goes well, he plans to expand the operation. In this case, the student imported public 
policy textbooks without the authorization of the copyright owner. Should this be 
allowed? 
We have already seen a great deal of this kind of arbitrage in the drng market, where 
U.S. residents are buying drngs from Canada at prices much lower than are available in 
the United States. The drug importation arbitrage is based on patent law instead of 
copyright, but the principle is the same. Parallel imports arise where international price 
differences exceed the costs of transporting and selling goods across borders (Maskus 
2000). 
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2. Parallel imports and the geographical limit of intellectual property right 
Parallel goods are not counterfeit but they are goods imported without the consent of 
the original right holders. Therefore, whether parallel imports infringe upon the rights of 
the original patent or trademark depends on the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 
At the first sale, the geographical limit of rights is usually recognized within national 
borders, but there is no consensus for products that cross the borders. It is possible for 
parallel imports to infringe upon right holders in the importing country, depending on the 
legal framework in the importing country. 
There are three principles concerning the geographical limit of rights. Under 
national exhaustion, rights at the first sale end within a country's territory. Intellectual 
property right owners may exclude parallel imports from other countries (U.S.). Under 
international exhaustion, intellectual property rights at first sale end anywhere (within or 
outside a country's territory) and parallel imports cannot be excluded (New Zealand, 
Singapore). Under regional exhaustion, intellectual property rights on the first sale end 
within a group of countries, thereby pennitting parallel trade among them; they are not 
exhausted by first sale outside the region (EU). 
Those countries that argue for international exhaustion, and therefore the allowance 
of parallel imports, emphasize the need for the free movement of goods in today's world 
economy. This economy is increasingly becoming integrated. Those countries that argue 
for national exhaustion point to the territorially-based nature of intellectual property 
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rights in each national territory, including blocking parallel imports, without being 
affected by whether the right has been exhausted elsewhere. 
Which of these principles should hold is not a settled issue. This issue had been 
extensively debated during the negotiation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), but was not resolved. American negotiators in the 
Uruguay Round tried to incorporate a global standard of national exhaustion into TRIPS 
(Maskus 2000). However, it was impossible to reach such an agreement because of 
divergent views on the benefits of parallel imports. Currently, it is not subject to dispute 
settlement under the TRIPS Agreement, and therefore each member nation can freely 
decide which exhaustion policy to adopt (Mikyung and Sungrni 2001). Therefore, the 
issue of allowing parallel imports of patented and trademarked medicines currently in 
Korea is not the question of the infringement of intellectual property rights but the policy 
question. A country's regime stating the territorial exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights is a key component (Maskus 2000). The global system of intellectual property 
rights, as established in the World Trade Organization, pennits each country to establish 
its own legal regime. 
3. Parallel Import Policies in Many Countries 
3-1. U.S. 
Basically, the U.S. has a policy that doesn't allow parallel imported goods. There are 
three key trademark statutes regulating or relating to parallel imports (Gallini and Hollis 
1999). First, '42 of the Lanham Act, prohibits the imports of an article which shall copy 
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or simulate the name of any manufacturer or trader registered in the U.S. or abroad. 
Second, the Tariff Act (19 U.S.C. '526) prohibits the importation of any merchandise of 
foreign manufacture if merchandise .... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a 
corporation or association created or organized within, the United States without consent. 
Third, Customs regulation 19 C.F.R. 133.21 forbids the importation of foreign-made 
articles bearing a trademark identical to one owned and recorded by a U.S. citizen or 
corporation. By these three key trademark statutes, parallel imports are regarded as an 
infringement upon Intellectual Propriety Rights (Gallini and Hollis 1999). 
However, there is an exception which is called the Common Control Exception. 
These conclusions were reached by the Supreme Court. First, rule 1: If the authorized and 
gray goods differ materially, the goods may be excluded under the Tariff Act (19 U.S.C. 
'526). Second, rule 2: Regardless of product similarity, if the U.S. trademark holder is 
independent of the foreign manufacture, or if it authorizes production of the trademarked 
goods by a U.S. trademark holder that is independent fim1 abroad, then the gray goods 
may be excluded under '526 (Gallini and Hollis 1999). 
Table 1 
Summary of IPR Exhaustion Regime in the U.S. 
Trademarks Patents Copyrights 
National exhaustion National exhaustion National exhaustion 
- but has limited exceptions 
by "common control" and no 
consumer confusion 
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Basically, the U.S. has a policy that doesn't permit parallel imported goods. However, 
many U.S. industries, especially recently the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, are potentially 
enormous targets for parallel traders. As mentioned in the introduction, the Canadian 
Health Ministry estimates that parallel trade represents 1-2% of all U.S. drug sales. This 
means that while a fair amount of medicine is purchased on a daily basis along U.S. 
borders, widespread parallel trade by official wholesalers and U.S. pharmacies has not 
occurred to the same degree as it has in the EU. But price variations across countries tend 
to give rise to parallel trade, and Americans would eventually find a way to re-import 
lower-priced life sciences products from Canada. 
3-2. EU 
The legal foundations of parallel trade are Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome 
and Trade Directive in 1986 (Arfwedson 2003). First, there are Articles 30 and 36 of the 
Treaty of Rome: It authorizes the free movement of goods and confers the right to control 
the import of goods on national governments. Second, Trade Directive (1986) upholds 
the principle of international exhaustion of Intellectual Prope1ty Rights. However, 
exhaustion will not apply where there are "legitimate reasons" for a trademark owner to 
oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the 
good is changed or impaired after it has been put on the market. The European Union is 
legally a single market. The European Court of Justice (ECS) has declared that, in the 
context of patent goods, the free circulation of goods takes precedence over intellectual 
property rights (Arfwedson 2003 ). 
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Table 2 
Summary of IPR Exhaustion Regime in EU 
Trademarks Patents Copyrights 
Community exhaustion Community exhaustion Community exhaustion 
Parallel Trade in the EU is forecasted to increase to $7.4 billion in 2006 compared to $3.3 
billion in 2001(Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2003). The UK has a large proportion of 
parallel trading within Europe. This is because of higher prices on selected products, one 
of the easiest licensing procedures for parallel imported products in Europe, and a 
reimbursement system in the National Health System that provides an incentive to 
parallel trade. 
3-3. New Zealand 
The copyright Act of 1994, which included software and additional legislation (The 
Copyright Border Protection Regulations 1994), strengthened the parallel impo_rt ban 
(Skoko 1998). These regulations have always been contentious and the Ministry of 
C01mnerce has expressed some concern that the current copyright protection may be too 
strong. 
After much discussion and review, the New Zealand Government, in its 1998 
budgets, removed the ban. The recent NZIER (the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research) review found that liberalized import laws generally benefit consumers. 
Books, for example, cost up to 30% more in New Zealand than elsewhere, and 
copyright holders do not supply all titles. Parallel importing should bring these prices 
down, as well as broaden the range of books available for local sales. 
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Table 3 
Summary of IPR Exhaustion Regime in New Zealand 
Trademarks Patents Copyrights 
International National exhaustion unless National exhaustion except 
exhaustion sold by patent owner without for compact discs and books 
clear restriction 
3-4. Japan 
The legal status of private obstruction of parallel imports depends both on 
intellectual property law and upon antitrust law. Japan's intellectual property law neither 
precludes nor sanctions parallel imports. But under the antimonopoly law of Japan, 
private obstruction of parallel imports is per se illegal (Flath and Nariu 2002). Its case 
law, however, makes Japan considerably more open to parallel imports than the U.S. 
Japan allows parallel imports in patented and trademarked goods unless the goods are 
explicitly barred from parallel trade by contract provisions, or unless their original sale 
was subject to foreign price regulation. The Aluminum Wheel Case (1994) is a turning 




Summary of Japan-Auto Products v BBS Kraftfarzeug Technik AG Case 
Background BBS company of German held both German and Japanese patents 
for certain aluminum automobile hubcaps. The hubcaps were 
legitimately purchased in Germany by a Japanese company called 
Autoprodoctor. Autoprodoctor sold the hubcaps in Japan through 
another Japanese company called Laschmax-Japan. These two 
companies were virtually under the same management when the 
goods were imported into Japan for sale at a price lower than that 
charged by BBS dealerships in Japan. 
It is understood that a patentee and a Japanese buyer may legally 
The Supreme 
contract with one another to preclude imports by anyone else if that Court of Japan 
decision stipulation is indicated on the patented product itself (the products not 
sold to the authorized distributor are stamped "not for sale in Japan"). 
Failing this, the international exhaustion doctrine applies, and the first 
sale terminates the patent rights around the world. The same 
presumably applies not only to patents but also trademarks (Naoko 
1996). 
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III. Parallel Imports in Korea 
1. Border Protection on Commodity of Intellectual Property Rights 
Korea had not allowed parallel imports until 1995 because they were regarded as an 
infringement on intellectual property rights. However, as the price of some branded 
commodities have continuously increased, the Korean government has allowed parallel 
imports in order to remove the monopoly position of distribution systems. 
Parallel imports have been allowed from the end of 1995 and apply only to 
commodities related to trademark. Allowing parallel imports in Korea stems from the 
import case of Levi's Jeans in 1995. When Price Club, a Korea's membership discount 
mall, imported a lot of Levi's Jeans from Costco Company, a large U.S. membership 
discount mall, Levi's Korea (the child company of Levi's) requested the Customs office 
not to pass customs clearance. At that time the Korea Customs Service did not pass them 
because Levi's Korea had an exclusive right to use the Levi's trademark in Korea. 
However, after this case, the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Korea Customs 
Service decided to allow parallel imports to combat high prices of branded products and 
inefficiencies in their distribution systems. The Korea Customs Service revised the 
Customs Act and set up the criteria for allowing parallel imports. 
The principal criteria are as follows: 
1) If a foreign trademark right holder and a domestic importer are an identical 
company or identical relationship, parallel impmis are allowed. If a foreign trademark 
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right holder has over 30% of the whole stocks of a child company, or a company is an 
import agency of a foreign trademark right holder, they are regarded as an identical 
relationship. 
2) If parallel importers get an exclusive right to use a trademark from a domestic 
trademark right holder that has an identical relationship with a foreign trademark owner, 
parallel imports are allowed. 
Therefore, if the foreign trademark holder and domestic trademark holder have no 
relations (for example: a foreign trademark holder sells to a domestic company to use its 
rights exclusively in a country, and the foreign trademark holder has no right in the 
country), the parallel imports are not permitted. 
The Customs Act understands that if an intellectual property right holder on a 
commodity is identical between both markets, the intellectual rights are exhausted upon 
the first sale and parallel imports cannot be excluded. In the case that foreign and 
domestic right holders have the same economic benefits, parallel imports are allowed. 
However, the Customs Act is not a substantive law on parallel imports, but a process law 
on customs clearance. The intellectual prope1iy rights laws don't have any specific 
regulations. Therefore, if an intellectual property right owner insists that the parallel 
imports do hmm his right, the Customs Office can refuse to pass the imported goods by 
the Customs Act 225 (the protection of intellectual property rights) until the imported 
goods tum out not to infringe upon the intellectual rights. 
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2. Competition Policy to Parallel Imports 
Another law related to the parallel imports is the Korea Fair Trade Commission's 
notice about "The unfair pattern on parallel imports". This notice applied only to 
trademarked goods. This notice does not provide the criteria that allow or prohibit 
parallel imports, but regulates in order to eliminate interrupting behaviors of parallel 
imports that were allowed through the Customs Act. 
This notice illustrates the unfair principal patterns concerning interrupting behaviors 
of parallel imports. 
1) When a foreign trademark holder contracts with a domestic seller in condition that 
does not sell parallel imported goods, it will be regarded as an unfair contract. 
2) When a foreign trademark holder supplies its goods at higher price to the domestic 
sellers (only because they sell parallel imported goods), it will be regarded as an unfair 
trade. 
3) If a foreign trademark holder stops the supply of its goods only because domestic 
sellers treat parallel imported goods it will be regarded as an unfair trade. 
4) If a domestic distributor contracts with a foreign trademark holder in condition that 
does not supply its goods to the parallel importers, this limitation on buyers ( or region) 
will be intem1pting behaviors of parallel impmts. 
After the Levi's jeans case, parallel imports have increased, but Korean court's 
attitude has not shown consistent decisions. In a Polo apparel case, the Korea Supreme 
Court judged that parallel imports infringed trademark rights. In a Burberry's apparel 
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case, the Seoul High Court of Justice ruled that the advertisement of parallel imported 
goods does not infringe trademark rights, and in that case parallel imports are allowed. 
However, parallel imports are a recent phenomenon in Korea, and there is no judgment 
about the essential factors of parallel import, whether parallel imports infringe trademark 
rights or not. 
3. Present Situation and Empirical Studies 
Parallel import data are generally hard to come by because customs authorities in 
many countries do not classify goods as parallel imported (Maskus 2000). There is not a 
lot of statistical data on parallel imports in Korea. The only official data are parallel 
import status (results) during 1995-2000 that are recorded by the Korea Customs 
Service. The Korea Customs Service stopped collecting data after 2001. The main reason 
for the stop is not clear but it may be because parallel imports are debated now and entail 
commercial issues from industrialized countries that have many intellectual rights. 
According to the Korea Customs Service data, the quantities of parallel imp01is 
increased rapidly in 1997. The ratio of parallel imports was 0.04% ($62,847,399) of total 
imp01ied goods ($144.62 billion). However, they were not much during 1998-1999 
because of Korea's national currency crisis. Parallel imports seemed to increase rapidly 
in the year 2000 and the ratio of parallel imports was 0.03% ($42,563,885) of total 
imported goods ($160.48 billion). This statistical data show that the share of parallel 
imports of total imported goods is still not much. However, it is estimated that the 
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economic impact of the main parallel imported goods such as golf club, clothing, 
handbags, ski supplies, bags and cosmetics is very significant. 
Table 5 
Parallel hnports Trend in Korea: 1995-2000 
Year Money(U.S. $) Main items 
1995 (Nov-Dec) 1,513,922 Golf clubs, Clothing, Handbags 
1996 11,594,716 Clothing, Golf clubs, Watches 
1997 62,847,399 Clothing, Handbags, Golf clubs 
1998 24,295,516 Clothing, Golf clubs, Handbags, Cosmetics 
1999 31,069,133 Clothing; Handbags, Golf clubs 
2000 42,563,885 Clothing, Handbags, Bags 
Although there is no other official data, we estimate that parallel imports are 
increasing through newspaper articles and an increasing amount of discount stores that 
deal with parallel imported goods. 
Empirical studies on parallel imports in Korea have not been found. Guak Eun Jin's 
study (1996) is almost the only one (Mikyung and Sungmi 2001). Besides her study, 
there are no specific empirical studies and only some cases can be found through some 
newspapers or general theses on parallel imports. Guak reveals the price difference of 
goods between monopolistic importers and parallel importers through the survey research 
of clothing, golf clubs and automobiles. Monopolistic impmiers' goods are about 30% 
higher than parallel importers' ones, and golf clubs are 23% higher. This means there is a 
possibility of parallel import arbitrage in 1996. 
IV. The Welfare Effect of Parallel Imports on the Korean Golf Club Market 
1. Outline of the Korean Golf Club Market 
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It is estimated that currently Korea has the 3rd highest market scale relating to the golf 
industry in the world (1 51 : America, 2nd : Japan). Golf has been regarded as a high class 
sports in Korea for a long time. It is one of the reasons that the price of golf clubs in 
Korea is traditionally expensive. There are many reasons to classify golf as a high class 
sport. First of all, Korea doesn't have a lot of land for making golf courses. Korea has a 
lot of high mountains (70% of the land) and doesn't have sufficient fields to build golf 
course. Many Korean people don't want to construct golf courses; they would rather 
build rice or paddy fields. A former president and Nobel Peace Prize winner of 2000, 
Kim Dae Jung, before he became president, used to insist, that "we have to switch current 
golf courses into rice or paddy fields" (The Hankyoreh21, 03-28-06). The demand for 
golfing is much bigger than the supply of golf courses. It is natural that golfing fees are 
very expensive. Foreign golf club companies have used a high price and high quality 
policy in the Korean market. As a consequence, the price of golf clubs has been higher 
than any other country for a long time. 
In addition to this, the Korean government has imposed a 14% of special consumption 
tax on golfers who use golf courses and buy golf clubs. Generally, special consumption 
tax is imposed on the consumption of luxury goods. Golf course fees and golf clubs 
become much more expensive. The average fee per person is about $200, and life-time 
golf course memberships are someti~nes traded for average $600,000 (the highest has 
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been $1,500,000 as of 5-1-2005). Therefore, mainly, rich retired people or business men 
wanting to entertain their buyers have enjoyed golf. However, recently the Korean golf 
market has been changing very fast. Much of the public has started to enjoy golfing, and 
the price of golf club is gradually lowering. There are a lot of reasons for this. 
First of all, recent economic development in Korea has allows many of the public people 
to enjoy golf. Income and wealth have increased continuously until now. As Korean 
people's income and wealth increase, people are starting to focus on leisure and sports. 
Especially the interest in golf is rapidly increasing. People who begin golfing are also 
getting younger than before and the number of many woman golfers has abruptly 
increased. 
Secondly, many Korean professional golfers have a good job at famous golf tour contests 
these days. When a Korean woman golfer, Se Ri Pak, won the LPGA U.S. Open in 1998, 
many Korean people were happy, and it increased interest in golf. At that time Korea had 
suffered from a national financial crisis, and many people had a hard time. In that hard 
time, the woman golfer, Se Ri Pak, gave Korean people a lot of courage to overcome the 
crisis. This is one reason golf has spread in Korea recently. After overcoming the national 
crisis, many Korean professional golfers have done well at world wide championships. In 
2005, Korean golfers won LPGA titles 8 times and PGA titles 2 times. In addition to this, 
the Korean-American golfer Michelle Wie has entered the LPGA currently and interest in 
golf is increasing. 
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Thirdly, public policy on golfing has changed these days. The Korean government 
does not regard golf as one of the noble sports anymore. Korea abolished the special 
consumption tax as of January 1st 2005. As a direct effect, golf course fees have been cut 
down by $30-40 and the price of golf clubs is also going down. The Korean government 
is planning to increase the number of golf courses to twice as many as now. 
Finally, a 5 day per week work system has been mandatory to all business since 
September 1st 2005 in Korea. a 5 day per week work system provides a great advantage 
to the golf industry. Golfers who enjoy golf on weekends are rapidly and continuously 
increasing. The Korean Leisure Institute estimates that the number of golfers will go from 
2.98 million in 2004 to 3.81 million in 2010, and it will be more difficult to book golf 
courses especially on weekends. 
It is very difficult to measure the total market scale of the golf industry exactly. 
According to the Korea Economy Newspaper's estimation (05-08-2002), 
the total scale of the golf industry in 2002 was about $13.3 billion. The Maeil 
Daily Economy Newspaper (05-18-2005) estimates that the total scale of 
the golf industry in 2005 was about $17 billion. Although it is difficult to 
compare the two data simply because their count base is different, the Korean golf 
industry is getting bigger. 
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Table 6 
The Whole Estimated Market Scale (Expenditure) of the Golf Industry 
Unit : Million US dollars 
Year Total Life-time Course Golf Golf Golf I Golf etc 
Membership Fee Clothing Range Club Ball 
2002 13343 10000 1700 700 408 385 150 
2005 17060 13000 2000 1000 600 400 I 60 -
fucrease 27.9 30 17.6 42.9 47.1 19.5 -
rate(%) 
Sources: the Maeil Daily Economy Newspaper (05-18-2005) and the Korea 
Economy Newspaper (05-08-2002) 
fu golf club markets, it is difficult to know the market sale scale exactly. That's 
because the principal leading foreign companies have a high market share and they don't 
want to reveal their sale scale in the Korean golf club market. According to the Maeil 
Daily Economy Newspaper (05-18-2005), it is estimated that annual total scale is $400 
million. The golf club market has grown at a 5% rate every year since 2000. 
We can expect a faster increase in the future because of the rapid spread of 
golfers. 
The foreign companies have a 70 % market share on sale scale and a 
90% market share on the amount of sale money. Japanese companies like 
Honma and Yamaha have a big market share on the high priced golf club 
market and American companies like Callaway and Nike have a big market 
share at the middle-high level priced golf market. 
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Korea's parallel imports of golf clubs began in 1995 and is increasing. Most of the 
parallel imported goods are American company brand products. That's because they are 
cheaper than Japan and other countries, and have good quality. 
Table 7 
Import of Golf Club in Korea 
Unit: $1,000 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Import 66,790 83.884 88, 109 113,471 148,060 150,720 189,939 
(26%) (5%) (29%) (30%) (2%) (26%) 
Source: Korea Customs Service: the annual record of trade statistic, ( ) is 
import increase rate: the average increase rate during 2000-2005 is 19.6% 
Table 8 
The Country of Origin of Imported Golf Club in Korea 
Unit: $1,000 
Total Japan U.S.A. China Taiwan etc 
1999 66,790 33,543 28, 118 846 3,924 269 
2005 189,939 128,184 51,293 8,633 697 110 
Source: Korea Customs Service: The Annual Record of Trade Statistic 
This study has done price research between Korea and America through Internet 
shopping malls. As a result of market price research on samples, the price level of 
parallel impmis is from 41 % to 91 % of normal imported goods (white goods). The 
average price difference between parallel golf clubs and white goods is about 66%. 
The major parallel imported golf clubs are TaylorMade and Callaway golf clubs. 
Both are American companies. Callaway is the most popular in iron golf club sets, and 
TaylorMade has the leading market share in driver and wood golf clubs. The price of 
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parallel imported Callaway golf clubs is from 56% to 77% of normal imported goods, 
and the price of TaylorMade golf clubs is from 41 % to 71 % of normal goods. One 
interesting and unusual thing is that the parallel imported RS Dual driver's price is lower 
than in the U.S. (72%). It seems that importers imported them too much, and as 
TaylorMade's new driver (R7) has begun to substitute them, sellers have sold them at a 
discounted price. 
Besides Callaway and TaylorMade, there are parallel imported golf clubs ofTitleist, 
Dunlop, Nike, Mizno and Cleveland. However, their market share is not big yet and a lot 
of internet shopping malls don't sell them or there is no significant price difference. 
Table 9 
The Price Comparison between White Market Goods and Gray Market Goods 
Research date: 12-16-2005 
Internet Shopping Mall Korea Internet Shopping Malls u.s 
Golf Club www.Dcgol Dnshop.daum. www.Jasongo Internet 
f.com net If.com Malls 
Callaway Driver(Mo White $470 $440 $475 $299 
del 454) market 
gray $265(56%) $270(61 %) $345(73%) 
market 
Iron set White $1,390 $1,500 $1,290 $699 
(X-18) (steel) (graphite) (steel) (steel) 
Gray $815(59%) $1,020(68%) $990(77%) 
Taylor Driver White $399 $495 $490 $279 
Made (RS dual) Gray $202(51 %) $205(41 %) -
Iron set White $931 - $1,050 $599 
(Rae os2) gray $660(71 %) $640 -
Titleist Driver White $525 - $810 $400 
(905T) Gray $480(91 %) $512 -
Iron set White - - $1,200 $799 
(690) Gray $1,080 $1,139 -
Average I 66% 66% 57% 75% 
* U.S. Internet Shopping Malls: www.golfgods.com/ www.dickssportinggoods.com/ 
www .edwinwatts.com 
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In the case of white market golf clubs, the price of golf clubs in Korea is higher than in 
the U.S. At the current market exchange rate, the Callaway golf club price in Korea is 
about 1.47-2.15 times higher than in the U.S., and the TaylorMade golf club price in 
Korea is about 1.33-1. 77 times higher. If we apply PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), the 
price difference between the two countries is even bigger. PPP is an estimate of the 
exchange rate required to equalize the purchasing power of different currencies, given the 
prices of goods and services in the countries concerned. PPP means that the price of an 
item in one country will be the same as the price of the item in another country using 
existing exchange rates. GDP per capita in Korea is about USD 13,645, while on a PPP 
basis, it is about USD 17 ,340 (World Bank 2000). Therefore, the PPP exchange rate is 
around 1:787, while the market exchange rate is 1:1,000. When we apply PPP to golf 
clubs, the Callaway golf club price in Korea is about 1.87-2.73 times higher than in the 
U.S., and the Taylor Made golf club price in Korea is about 1.82-2.25 times higher than 
in the U.S. 
Aside from transportation costs, tariff (8% of the imported price) and other transaction 
costs, major brand golf clubs are too expensive in Korea. Why are they so expensive in 
Korea? As this paper states earlier, golfing has been enjoyed by high income people or 
the upper class for a long time in Korea. The wealthy Korean golfers traditionally prefer 
only foreign made golf clubs, and golf shops have sold mostly high priced foreign made 
golf clubs for a long time (Weekly Dong-a, 4-22-04). Callaway and Honma golf clubs 
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have enjoyed a royal position in Korea. (An informal survey looked at 10 Korean golfers 
at the Springfield Country Club and 8 of them have Callaway iron golf clubs. Apparently 
Korean golfers still like famous brand golf clubs.) The major golf club companies have 
used a high price policy in the Korea golf market by means of their monopolistic child 
companies. The higher the golf club price was, the more the sale quantity was. Although 
this policy has been weakened today due to the increase in public golfers, and many golf 
shops stock Korean made or parallel imported golf clubs, the major brand golf clubs still 
maintain a high price in Korea. Major brand golf clubs still have a lot of bubble price 
(Weekly Dong-a, 4-22-04). 
The high price of major golf clubs will continue for the time being as long as 
Korean golfers keep preferring foreign made golf clubs. It seems that preference for 
foreign made golf clubs will continue for some time. Many Korean golfers believe that 
the minor quality difference of golf clubs creates significant results in golfing because 
golf is a mental sp01i. Major brand companies also differentiate their golf clubs. For 
example: Callaway Korea insists that Callaway golf clubs in Korea differ from Callaway 
golf clubs in U.S. Callaway golf clubs in Korea fit Koreans' physical characteristics and 
body structure, although there seems to be no big difference of external features. 
Therefore, major brand companies insist that the high price is the result of long research 
and effort and is natural. 
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Table 10 
The Price Comparison of White Market Goods between Korea and the U.S. 
Research date: 12-16-2005 
futemet Shopping Mall Korea futemet Shopping Malls 
Golf Club www.Dcgolf. Dnshop.daum. www.Jasongo 
com net If.com 
Callaway Driver(Mo MER $470(157%) $440(147%) $475(159%) 
del 454) PPP $597(200%) $559(187%) $607(203%) 
Iron set MER $1,390(199%) $1,500(215%) $1,290(185%) 
(X-18) PPP $1,766(253%) $1,906(273%) $1,639(234%) 
Taylor Driver MER $399(133%) $495(177%) $490(176%) 
Made (R5dual) PPP $507(182%) $629(225%) $623(223%) 
Iron set MER $931(155%) - $1,050(175%) 
(Rae os2) PPP $1,183(197%) - $1,334(224%) 
* U.S. futemet Shopping Malls: www.golfgods.com/ www.dickssportinggoods.com/ 
www.edwinwatts.com 
** MER (market exchange rate): 1,000Won=lUSD 








2. The Welfare Effect Analysis of Parallel Imported Golf Clubs in K_orea 
2-1. Basic Assumptions 
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1) This paper assumes that parallel imports began in 2006 for the first time. This 
assumption helps this study to see the effects of parallel imports easily. 
2) This study assumes that before parallel imports the market share of foreign made golf 
club is 90% and Korean made golf club is 10%. The real market share of Korean made 
golf club is estimated at about 10% now (The Maeil Daily Economy Newspaper 05-18-
2005). This assumption reflects this real market share. 
3) After permitting parallel imports, the situation of the golf club market changes. Korean 
made golf clubs and major brand golf clubs for which normal or parallel imported are 
substituted in consumption. Since parallel imports result in a decrease in the demand for 
the Korean domestic golf club and normal imported golf club (white market), this causes 
decrease in the price of brand golf club. 
This study assumes that the average market share of parallel imported golf clubs 
is 10%, and that the market share of Korean made golf clubs would fall from 10% to 7% 
(some consumers would switch to parallel impmied brand golf clubs), and the market 
share ofnomrnl imported golf clubs would fall from 90% to 83%. 
Table 11 
The Assumption of Market Share Change 
white Domestic Parallel imports 
Without parallel imports 90% 10% 0% 
With parallel imports 83% 7% 10% 
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4) The assumption of price difference between normal imported golf clubs (white market) 
and parallel imported golf clubs (gray market) is an average of 30%. This is based on the 
current real price difference. 
Table 12 
The Real Price Difference of Iron Golf Clubs 
As of 12-14-2005 
Korea futemet U.S. Malls 
Shopping Malls 
Iron set Normal $1,290 - $1,500 $699 -
(Callaway x-18) Parallel $815 - $1,020 $799 
Korean made iron set $ 500-$850 
Parallel goods are 30% cheaper than white goods. Korean made golf clubs are 
30% cheaper than parallel goods. Though iron golf clubs have a bigger difference than 
driver golf clubs, the average price difference is estimated at 30%. 
Therefore, this study assumes that the price of golf clubs is as follows: Before parallel 
imports, the price of the normal imported golf club set (iron set+ driver) is $1,500, and 
the price of the Korean made golf club set is $600 ( 40% level). With the parallel imports, 
the price of parallel impmied golf club set is $1,000, the price of the normal impmied 
golf club set falls from $1,500 to $1,350(10% fall), and the price of a Korean made golf 
club set falls from $600 to $540 (10% fall). 
5) The assumptions about sale quantity are as follows: before parallel imports, the 
sale quantity of golf club set is 500,000 per year. 450,000 (90%) of them are white goods 
and 50,000 (10%) of them are Korean made golf clubs. This is based on the Korea 
Leisure News (08-17-13). 
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Table 13 
The Assumption of Price and Sale Quantity (Price, Sale Quantity) Change 
white domestic Parallel imports 
Without parallel imports ($1,500, 450,000) ($600, 50,000) ($0, 0) 
With parallel imports ($1,350, 415,000) ($540, 35,000) ($1000, 50,000) 
i-2. The welfare effects 
Table 14 
The Summary of Welfare Effect on Consumers 
Unit: Thousands of US Dollars 
Bnefits - Costs 77,375- 2,375 74,475 
Consumers' Net 76,850 
Benefits( surplus) * Direct effect 12,500 
Brand golf clubs' (gray goods) consumers' 
benefit 
* * fudirect effect 64,350 
**-i'Brand golf clubs'(white goods) consumers' 62,250 
benefit 
**-2 Korea domestic golf clubs' consumers 2,100 
*** Others 
Consumers' 1) The decreased consumer surplus due to AS 2,375 
Costs ( after service) cost 
2) Others 
2-2-1 Consumer Benefits: Increase Consumer's Surplus 
The economic literature on the welfare effect is limited. No clear case may be made that 
parallel imports are necessarily beneficial or harmful in welfare terms, although they do 
impair the interests of intellectual property right owners (Maskus 2001). Parallel imports 
arise where international price differences exceed the costs of transpo1iing and selling 
goods across borders. Parallel imports undermine price differentials, driving prices down 
to the lowest price in the trading area (Danzan 1999). If parallel imports are permitted, 
therefore, the manufacturer's profit maximization strategy is to attempt to achieve a 
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single, uniform price in all connected markets in the long run. Uniform pricing leads to 
lower consumer welfare than differential pricing, although they could be served under 
differential pricing. Uniform prices preempt parallel trade, which implies higher prices in 
traditionally low-price countries (Danzan 1998). 
However, parallel import becomes another channel for authentic goods and creates a new 
product version that allows the manufacturer to price discriminate. That is, the parallel 
importer gives consumers more choice and the manufacturer a new way to segment the 
market and price discriminate. One segment of consumers will stay with the authorized 
version because they place more value on the warranty and services that come with the 
authorized version. Another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is 
offered, due to its lack of warranties or county of origin. Also generated by parallel 
imports is the third and new segment that would not have bought this product before 
(Ahmadi and Yang 2000). Therefore, the effect of lowering price generally will increase 
consumers' welfare. A study commissioned by the European Commission predicted that 
parallel imports would reduce music CD prices by just 0.6% (NERA 1999). By contrast, 
the Australian authorities projected that parallel imp01is would reduce prices by 5-33% 
(Parliament of Australia 1997). 
* Direct effect: Increase consumers' surplus of brand named golf clubs (gray goods) 
Consumers' surplus is the difference between a consumer's willingness to pay for a good 
and the amount of money that must be spent to obtain the good. Consumer's surplus can 
be interpreted as a monetary measure of individual welfare change. Allowing parallel 
imports gets consumers to increase consumers' welfare. Consumers will be better off 
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because they can purchase genuine major brand golf clubs at a lower price than before. 
Consider the market for parallel imported golf clubs which is depicted in Fig.1. Suppose 
a parallel imported golf club set is currently not available. There is going to be a change 
that will offer parallel imported good club set for sale in a market at the price P1 ($1,000). 
$S 
0 (Gray) Golf Club 
Figure 1. Consumers' Surplus of Parallel Imports (=KE1P1) 
Since consumers will purchase Q1 units (50,000), as assumption 5), at this price they 
must be better off because of this change. A monetary measure of this benefit would be 
given by the consumers' willingness to pay for a change that would make them better off. 
What is the largest amount of money they would be willing to pay to be able to purchase 
the parallel golf club (in any desired quantity) at the price P1 ($1,000)? How about 
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KE1P1, or the consumers' surplus? By paying KE1P1 for the opportunity to buy golf clubs 
at the price P 1 ($1,000), and then spending OP1E 1Q1 to purchase Qi units (50,000), the 
consumers would be exactly spending their OKE1 Q1 for Q1 units of gray golf club. But 
they would spend no more than KE1P1 for this opportunity because that would mean they 
spent more on 50,000 units of golf club than their OKE1 Q1 for 50,000 units of golf club. 
When the price of the parallel imported golf club set is the same as the price of the 
normal imported golf club set (= $1,500), no one is willing to buy the parallel goods. 
Therefore, K=$1,500, and consumers' surplus of parallel imported golf club (KE1Pl) is 
counted as $12,500,000 (=$500 x 50,000 x 1/2). 
** Indirect (Secondary) effects 
**-1 Increase consumers' surplus ofbrand golf clubs (white goods) 
The market equilibrium without parallel imports is determined by the intersection of 
Dl and Sin Fig.2. Since the parallel imports of brand golf clubs (gray goods) result in a 
decrease the demand for the substitute, this causes a decrease in the price of brand golf 
clubs (white goods), and the white market golf club with the parallel imports is given by 
D2 and S. As a result of the government's policy to pennit parallel imports, the price of 
nonnal impmied golf club (white goods) is P3 rather than P2, and white market golf club 




0 Q3=415,000C,h=450,000 (White) Golf Club 
Figure 2. Consumers' Surplus of White Golf Clubs 
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By assumption 2), 3) and 4), P2=$1500, P3=$1350, Q2=450,000, and Q3=418,500. What 
would white market golf club consumers be willing to pay for? The change in consumers' 
surplus is given by the shaded area in Fig 2. This change in consumers' surplus of white 
market golf club is an indirect (secondary) benefit of parallel imports. 
A mistake is often made in the interpretation of consumers' surplus in the white golf club 
market, by noting there is a decrease (K1K2E2E3) in white market golf clubs. It is 
sometimes mistakenly asserted that this decrease in white golf clubs is associated with a 
cost that must be netted against the benefit in the gray market for golf clubs. But there is 
no lost utility for consumers of white goods due to the parallel imports. Some consumers 
voluntarily switch from white goods consumption to gray goods consumption because the 
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gray goods are cheaper than white goods in spite of the same quality. They make this 
switch because they are better off, which means they benefit. Of course this leads to a 
decrease in demand for white goods which leads then to a decrease in the price for white 
goods. Therefore, those consumers who remain in the white good market are also better 
off because of a lower price. There simply is no cost to consumers of either white goods 
or gray goods to net because none of these consumers ends up on lower indifference 
curves. All the consumers in these two markets move to higher indifference curves. 
In this study's case, estimation of the parallel imports' benefits would require estimation 
of the demands for white goods and gray goods, along with estimation of the prices of 
both commodities with and without the parallel imports. However, deriving or estimating 
supply and demand curve is very difficult because exact data are not sufficient. Thus, 
although this is a little overestimated (triangle ABE3 in figure 2), this study 
approximately counts consumer surplus by multiplying price decrease and the quantity of 
white goods with parallel imports. The consumer surplus = the price decrease x the 
quantity of white golf clubs with parallel imp01is = $150 x 418,500 = $62,250,000. 
**-2 Increase consumer surplus of Korean made golf clubs 
The logic of consumer surplus on the white market is applied equally to the Korean made 
golf club market. Since parallel imports result in a decrease in the price of major brand 
golf clubs, this causes a decrease in the demand for the substitute, and the Korean 
domestic golf club market with the parallel import is given by D2 and S. As a result of 
the parallel imports of major brand golf clubs the price of Korean domestic golf clubs is 
PS rather than P4, and Korean domestic golf club consumers are better off, other things 
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being constant. The change in consumers' surplus is given by the shaded area in the 
diagram. By assumption 2), 3) and 4), P4=$600, P5=$540, Q4=50,000, and Q5=35,000. 
Thus, although this is a little overestimated (in figure2, triangle KME2 is overestimated), 
this study roughly counts consumer' surplus by multiplying price decrease and the 
quantity of normal imported golf clubs (white goods) with parallel imports. The 
consumers' surplus = the price decrease x the quantity with parallel imports = $60 x 




0 0 5=35,000 Q4=50,000 Golf Club 
Figure 3. Consumers' Surplus of Korean Made Golf Clubs 
*** Other Benefit 
***-1 Reduce counterfeit goods 
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Parallel imports can reduce counterfeit goods. The price difference of golf clubs 
in Korea is too diverse. The price difference of a set of golf clubs is from $500 to $5000-
6000. Korean made full golf club sets are sold well below $1000, U.S. products have a 
nearly monopolistic market share between $3000 and 4,000, and Japan products are sold 
for well over $4000. Parallel imports are mostly made in U.S. and are sold from $2,000 to 
3,000. Counterfeited golf clubs are sold for just $150-250. We cannot know exactly the 
sale quantity of counterfeited golf clubs. Most counterfeited golf clubs imitate Japanese 
products. That's because U.S. companies have lowered price continuously, and the 
parallel imports of U.S. products substituted for them have increased rapidly. As a result 
of that, many imitators have given up making U.S. products. 
***-2 Increase major brand value 
Parallel imports have the possibility to mcrease major brand value. Parallel 
imports give the manufacturer a new way to segment the market and price discriminate. 
One segment of consumers stays with the regular imported goods (white goods) because 
they place more value on the wmrnnty and services that come with the white goods. 
Another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is offered, due to its 
lack of country specific features or wmrnnties. Also generated by parallel imports is the 
third and new segment that would not have bought this product before (Reza Ahmadi, 
2002). 
Unlike counterfeits that are fabricated by imitators, parallel imported golf clubs are 
genuine and sourced from the manufacturer in the lower priced country through an 
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authorized dealer. Therefore, the manufacturer's total global sales quantity should 
increase. In Korean golf markets, most of parallel imported golf clubs are Callaway or 
TaylorMade clubs. Actually, their sale quantities including parallel imported goods have 
increased more than 10% every year, but profit may rise or fall depending on the relative 
sizes and profitability of the segments. Anyway, because the market share is one of the 
most important things on determining brand value, the bigger market share can increase 
the brand value. However it is very difficult to measure market share as money. 
2-2-2. Consumer Costs 
1) The decreased consumer surplus due to AS ( after service) cost 
The biggest difference between normal imported golf clubs and parallel imported golf 
clubs is in AS. Most parallel importers in Korea are small companies or individuals. They 
cannot supply AS with their golf clubs. Normal imported goods can receive AS for free. 
However, some companies like Callaway give after service to the gray goods for money 
(not for free) on defects. Of course consumers of parallel impmied golf clubs can receive 
in the U.S. because parallel impmied golf clubs are not counterfeits but genuine products. 
Consumers can receive AS service for free if they send their golf clubs to the brand 
company in the U.S. However, it must much more expensive because of transportation 
cost and time. Therefore, the absence of AS increase cost to consumers. In the Korean 
used golf club market, golfers who want to sell their parallel imported golf clubs should 
discount an additional 5-10% of the golf club price as an AS cost. This study adds an 
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assumption that if the average AS cost is 5% of the golf club price, supply curve will shift 
upward (S 1-S2) and equilibrium quantity will fall 5%. 
0 02=47,500 01=50,000 Golf Club 
Figure 4. The Decreased Consumers' Surplus due to AS Costs> 
The decreased consumer surplus due to AS costs is counted as P1P2E2E1 in Fig 4. It 
is counted as $2,375.000 (=$50 x 47,500. It is underestimated as triangle E2E1A in Fig 4) 
2) The problem of encouraging consumer deception and trade in counterfeit goods and 
pirated goods 
n is often argued that permitting parallel imports encourages consumer deception 
and trade in counterfeit goods and pirated goods. However, such arguments are irrelevant 
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in the strict sense of assessing the impacts of parallel imports. Consumer deception would 
occur if lower-quality parallel imports were marketed as legitimate versions of higher-
quality products (Maskus 2000). Counterfeiting and piracy are trade in unauthorized 
versions of products, which is a different concept than parallel imports. In either case, 
customs authorities are empowered to act against such trade without restricting genuine 
parallel imports. Therefore this is not a cost of parallel imports. 
3) Free-riders 
Parallel imports are sold at a lower price to consumers than regular imported golf 
clubs. However, these may not necessarily have a lower profit margin because they can 
free ride on the promotional efforts of authorized dealers. In general, many firms do a 
lot of advertisements to inform people about their goods. In the case of general 
consumption goods, it is known that on average, 4-8% of the total sale amount is used 
for advertising costs. If golf club companies like Callaway and TalyorMade or 
franchisers invest in adve1iisements or post-service, such as supporting golf contests, 
this can play an important role in maintaining brand value. However, parallel impmiers 
don't need to pay these costs. Therefore, parallel impmiers are free-riders that gain 
benefits out of a brand company's advertisement and fame. Parallel imports may 
undermine authorized dealers' selling effmis. 
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2-3. Sensitivity Analysis 
This study changes 2 assumptions to know the change of consumer's welfare 
sensitively, and the other assumptions remain unchanged. First of all, this study changes 
an assumption that the market share of parallel imported golf clubs is 10%. If the market 
share of parallel imported golf clubs is 20%, what is the change of consumers' welfare? 
Secondly, this study assumes that before parallel import the sale quantity of a full golf 
club set is 500,000 per year. However, if the current market is bigger than our 
assumption, what is the change of consumers' welfare benefit? 
A simple sensitivity analysis of the Korean golf market shows that parallel imports 
give not only consumers' surplus on parallel imported golf clubs (gray goods), but also 
much more consumers' surplus on authorized brand versions (white goods). However, 
the more the market share of parallel imports is, the less consumer surplus of white 
goods. That is because the more the market share of parallel imports is, the more 
consumers switch to parallel imports. If current the market scale is bigger than this 
paper's assumption (Alternative 3), the consumer benefits are getting bigger. Therefore, 
accurate estimates about market scale help the decision on whether parallel imports 
should be pennitted or not. The result of simple sensitive analysis is as follows: 
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Table 15 
The Result of Simple Sensitive Analysis 
Unit: thousands of U.S. dollars 
Assumptions Basic result Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
The average market share of parallel 10% 20% 10% 
imported golf club 
The annual sale quantity of golf club full 500,000 500,000 units 1,000,000 units 
set. units 
Net (Benefits-Costs) 74,475 79,575 148,950 
Consumer Benefits 76,850 84,325 153,700 
* Brand golf clubs' (gray goods) 12,500 25,000 25,000 
consumers' benefit 
**-1 white goods' consumers' benefit 62,250 58,125 124,500 
**-2 Korean made golf clubs' 2,100 1,200 4,200 
consumers' 
2,375 4,750 4,750 
Consumer Costs 2,375 4,750 4,750 
* The decreased consumer surplus due to 
AS ( after service) cost 
2-2-3 Producer or Distributor Welfare 
Until now, this paper has studied the consumer benefits of parallel imports in the 
Korean golf market. Korean golfers' benefits increase because they can buy major 
brand golf clubs or Korean made golf clubs at a lower price. However, Korean golf 
producers lose some benefit because parallel impmted golf clubs substitute for Korean 
made golf clubs. 
Major brand golf club producer benefits depend on the profit of parallel impmted 
golf clubs. If the profit of parallel imported golf clubs is bigger than the loss of white golf 
clubs, benefits will increase. 
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To summarize, the winners and losers are as follows: 
Table 16 
The Winners and Losers in Parallel Imports in the Korean Golf Club Market 
Participants Entry of Gray Goods Contents 
Winner Loser 
Korean golfers 0 Lower prices 
Korean golf club producers 0 Fewer goods sold 
Major brand golf club producers Indeterminate 
Korean gray market distributors 0 
-------
More goods sold 
Korean white market distributors (0 '\ Fewer goods sold 
\ 
z 
-\ a 1P"-o • 
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V. A Proposal of Public Policy on Parallel Imports 
The issue of permitting parallel imports of patented and trademarked medicines is 
being debated currently with much concern and controversy. In this situation, this study 
looks at many countries' trends, TRIPS regulation, and a simple consumer benefit-cost 
analysis of parallel imports. Through this study, we recommend some rules regarding 
when parallel imports should be allowed and when they should not be. This paper makes 
the following recommendations. 
First of all, parallel imports should be permitted according to the principle of free 
trade, if the cost of parallel imports to the country is not much larger than the benefit to 
consumers. Parallel imports provide much consumer benefit, and the restraints against 
parallel imports might constitute non-tariff barriers to trade. However, policymakers 
should consider the economic effects which parallel imports give to the country. If the 
cost of parallel imports is much bigger than benefit, it should not be allowed. The TRIPS 
Agreement states that each country has established its own public policy covering parallel 
imports. 
When we see the simple consumer welfare benefit-cost analysis of the parallel 
imports of the Korean golf club market through a lot of assumptions, the benefits, 
especially consumer surplus, are very big. A simple consumer welfare benefit-cost and 
sensitivity analysis of the Korean golf market shows that parallel imports give not only 
consumers' surplus on parallel imported golf clubs (gray goods), but also much more 
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consumers' surplus on authorized brand versions (white goods). However, the parallel 
import cost might be much bigger. Producer surplus, above all, is decreased. For Korean 
made golf clubs, the decrease of producer surplus may be small because the market share 
is not big. However, the situation in other industries may be totally different. 
According a research, drug parallel trade would cost the California State economy 
at least $670 million and 23,900 jobs, and as much as $3 billion and 105,600 jobs, 
because pharmaceutical and biotech research are heavily concentrated in California 
(Romero 2006). After the analysis of economic effects, other issues should be considered. 
In the case of medicines, of course, issues other than free trade come into play. Public 
safety, availability, and the difference in health insurance systems and pricing policies 
must all be considered. 
Second, even if parallel imports are permitted, there can be allowed some 
exceptional cases where international exhaustion is problematic. For example, when the 
intellectual rights holders in the exporting country and importing country are different, it 
is difficult to presume that the owner's rights have exhausted in the importing country, on 
first sale in the exporting country. Therefore, parallel imports should be restricted. The 
Korea Customs Service Act now regulates these principles. However, the Act just 
processes regulations relating to customs clearance and has legal uncertainties. Therefore, 
customs regulations on parallel impmis must change into substantial law that has legal 
validity. 
Third, governmental intervention or public policy is required to protect consumers 
and to reduce the cost of parallel imports. Government has to inform and educate 
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consumers. Consumers have to have full information about parallel imported products. 
For example, the government has to set up a clear labeling system of all parallel imported 
goods. The government also must disclose to customers of parallel importers and their 
distributors that they are not authorized dealers and that the product is not sourced 
through authorized channels, and that therefore parallel imports may not offer the same 
guarantee. Under complete information, consumers can choose rationally which product 
is the best choice. Government's public policy to help consumers' rational choice is 
necessary. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Arfwedson, Jacob (2003) 'Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals' Institute for policy 
Innovation, 1-43 
Danzon, Patricia M (1998) 'The Economics of Parallel Trade' Phamacoeconomics 
Mar; 13(3), 293-304 
Eunjin, Guak (1996) 'A Study of the Effect of Parallel hnports' Sukmyung Women's 
University. 
Flath, David and Tatsuhiko Nariu (2002) 'Parallel hnports and Japan Fair Trade 
Commission' Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Columbia Business 
School, August, 1-20 
45 
Gallini, Nancy T. and Aidan Hollis (1999) 'A Contractual Approach to the gray market' 
International Review of Law and Economics, 19, 1-21 
Life Science Navigator (2003) 'Battling Gray Market Goods' August 
www.ey.com/industry/health 
Maskus, Keith. E. (2000) 'Parallel hnports' The World Economy, 23(9), 1269-1284 
Mygung, Yun and Lee. Sungmi (2001) 'WTO TRIPS Discussion on Parallel hnports' 
Korea Institute for International Policy, 1-11, 
National Economic Research Association (1999) The Economic Consequence of the 
Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks (London:NARA) 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Copyright Amendment Bill (No.2): 
Explanatory Memorandum, Canbena, 1997. 
Romero, Philip J. (2006) The High Cost of Low-Priced Drugs to California: Lost 
Investment, Lost Jobs, & Lost R&D, Pacific Research Institute 1-32 
Skoko, Hazbo (1998) 'Theory and Practice of Parallel hnpo1is: the New Zealand Case' 
Charles Sturt University, 1-23 

